ISTANBUL 1 – ISTANBUL 2: Coincidence or Intent? Part Three: ASSESSMENT

The Russian proposal for peace negotiations in Istanbul reflects a continuation of the same diplomatic posture and offensive negotiation tactics, while maintaining initiative on the front in Ukraine.

ISTANBUL 2: The Continuation

Geopolitically speaking, I agree with the assessment by Sergey Poletaev (''Whatfor'' project): for Vladimir Putin, Ukraine is not the ultimate goal but rather a means to a broader end. The Kremlin's strategic aim is to revise the outcome of the Cold War and push the West, primarily the United States, toward recognizing a Russian sphere of influence. In the long term, this would position Moscow as an important pole of power in a multipolar world. Within that framework, Russia will continue seeking to bring Ukraine back under its influence ‒ whether through political maneuvering or military pressure. The core objective is to ensure the West can no longer exploit Ukraine as a tool against Russia.

A key dilemma remains: will Putin go as far as to destroy Ukraine, even at the cost of confrontation with President Donald Trump? Or will he seek to negotiate a division of spheres of influence with Trump, should such an opportunity arise ‒ even if that means abandoning the idea of forcing Kyiv into full capitulation?

For Russia, the most favorable scenario would be a U.S. withdrawal from the conflict. Without American leadership, Europe would be incapable of confronting Russia effectively, at least until a major societal transformation occurs and a centralized, authoritarian decision-making structure is established. Until then, Europe will likely continue preparing for war ‒ but mostly in rhetoric, not in action.

Geostrategically, Russia is currently managing to reinforce its expeditionary forces in Ukraine with up to 30,000 volunteers each month. This ensures troop rotation and rest, while also creating the conditions for the formation of new units and the development of military infrastructure in vulnerable areas, particularly in the north, given the approximately 1,000-kilometer border with Finland.

Russia is not preparing for a new war in Europe after Ukraine, but it is methodically preparing for a total military confrontation if NATO dares to take such a step, despite repeated warnings from Russian officials that nuclear weapons will be used if deemed necessary.

In this context, the new nuclear doctrine (''Основы государственной политики Российской Федерации в области ядерного сдерживания'', approved on November 19, 2024) provides a framework for the accelerated decision-making process in the event such a determination is made.

The Western military establishment, namely the Pentagon and Brussels, motivated by ambitions of controlling the Eurasian "Grand Chessboard", fully embraced the geopolitical reasoning of Zbigniew Brzezinski, including his timeline projection that Ukraine should join the Euro-Atlantic structures no later than 2015 (see more in my book: https://zvekibra.substack.com/p/war-in-ukraine-on-the-road-to-armageddon).

At the core of that strategic vision lay the assumption that the West could defeat Russia through conventional means (relying on the perceived obsolescence and inefficiency of Russia’s army and navy) and that Moscow would refrain from using nuclear weapons.

However, nearly three years into the war and following the implementation of Russia’s strategy of attrition ‒ targeting both Ukraine and the West ‒ this paradigm has begun to shift. A turning point came with the demonstration of the hypersonic ''Oreshnik'' system (capable of speeds exceeding Mach 10 and armed with six nuclear submunitions of 150 kilotons each), which served as a stark warning. It forced alienated Western ''elites'' to confront the reality: the West cannot defeat the Russian Federation through conventional warfare without triggering a potential nuclear response.

After initially lagging in the deployment of UAVs during the Special Military Operation, Russia has since ramped up mass production, not just of drones, but across the board in weapons manufacturing. According to recent estimates, production of the Geran drones has increased from 200 to as many as 1,000 units per week. Interestingly, Kinzhal hypersonic missiles have not been used in the theater for nearly six months, which may suggest they are being stockpiled for a decisive strike ‒ or perhaps, at this stage of the conflict there are simply no targets of sufficient strategic value.

Strategically, Russian expeditionary forces continue their gradual advance westward, maintaining air superiority and operational initiative along multiple directiоns, with a primary focus on Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka. Smaller tactical units have crossed the northern border into the Sumy region. Meanwhile, elements of the vanguard on the Novopavlivka direction have reached positions between 1.5 to 4 kilometers from the administrative border with Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine are conducting a flexible yet determined strategic defense, aiming to shift combat operations onto Russian home territory, specifically into "pockets" within the Kursk region and certain areas of Belgorod. They are also working to further neutralize the Black Sea Fleet (with broad British support) and inflict damage on critical infrastructure targets in Crimea and deep inside Russia proper, particularly oil refineries, gas facilities, and elements of the military-industrial complex.

Beyond these objectives, such actions are also meant to secure continued financial and military support from Western allies, who are intent on inflicting maximum damage on Russia. The prevailing assumption is that intensified sanctions, (for example, stricter enforcement against the so-called "shadow fleet" transporting Russian oil) could force Moscow to at least scale back its stated preconditions in any future negotiations.

Kyiv has significantly increased its use of various types of drones, deploying over 500 per day in the lead-up to the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow. They are also employing modern electronic warfare systems. So far, no effective countermeasure has been found against Russia’s fiber-optic-guided drones, and leading Western powers have yet to deliver their most advanced anti-drone systems, such as those based on microwave technology.

For Russia, regaining full control over the historical region of Novorossiya is of strategic importance (part of what some analysts term its "new imperial imperative''). It is difficult to determine which oblast might be prioritized in the long run. Kharkiv lies just 500 kilometers from Moscow, and any deployment of Ukrainian, and especially foreign missile systems there would pose a direct threat to Russia’s missile defense network and key national infrastructure.

According to Western estimates, rare metal and mineral deposits in the Dnipropetrovsk region are valued at approximately $1.5 trillion. Odesa holds strategic significance for both Ukraine and Russia; however, Moscow currently lacks the naval and ground capabilities to establish control over the city and its port.

Russian nationalists believe Odesa will eventually return to the fold of the "Russian World'', most likely in the event of a Ukrainian capitulation ‒ a scenario that cannot be entirely ruled out. This possibility is heightened by growing British and French interest in establishing a presence in the region, as part of broader strategies such as the "Anaconda Loop" (a concept rooted in the work of General Wilfried Scott, Halford Mackinder, and Zbigniew Brzezinski). Russia, for its part, would likely move to block such moves at all costs.

It remains to be seen whether the West will continue to ignore Russia’s repeated demands for Ukraine’s neutral status, including a complete ban on foreign military presence on its territory and a commitment to never pursue nuclear weapons. Moscow will likewise continue to push for the demilitarization of Ukraine ‒ meaning a reduction of its armed forces to a level that poses no threat to Russian national security.

The Kremlin is also expected to insist on the full ''liberation'' of all territories it now claims as part of the Russian Federation under its Constitution, namely the four annexed regions and Crimea. In addition, Russia is likely to demand the ''denazification'' of the Ukrainian state, the cessation of discrimination against Russian-speaking populations, the resolution of religious tensions (the aim of Law №8371 in 2024 is to ban the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate), and the lifting of all Western sanctions.

There is a bit more hope in the aftermath of a two-hour phone conversation between Putin and Trump on May 19, during which Russia reportedly expressed readiness to work with Ukraine on a "memorandum" for a future peace agreement. This would outline the principles and timeline for a peaceful settlement, including the possibility of a temporary ceasefire, provided a corresponding agreement can be reached. President Putin reiterated that for Russia the key condition remains the elimination of the root causes of the crisis: NATO's eastward expansion, the presence of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory, and Ukraine’s demilitarization as a strongly pro-Western military power. Only after those issues are addressed could compromise be considered.

It is evident that both warring sides, after three years of exhausting war, are increasingly inclined to engage more seriously in a negotiation process, with or without (though this remains unlikely) American mediation, and with potential European assistance, which would be in Ukraine’s favor. The involvement of European mediators remains doubtful, further undermined by statements from European officials about imposing new sanctions on Russia and the potential delivery of long-range German Swedish Taurus cruise missiles (with a range exceeding 500 kilometers) to Ukraine.

A particular issue is the legal status of the signatories of the future agreement, given the Ukrainian law that prohibits it and the legally illegitimate position of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, whose mandate expired in May 2024. Such a situation allows the Ukrainian side to reject unacceptable conditions under this pretext (as long as it remains at a technical level). On the other hand, Russia will seek to insist on holding elections for a new president to buy time and gain control over new territories in the context of military superiority and the attrition of enemy human resources.

The economic situation in Russia is fragile (lack of investment, rising inflation, a military budget exceeding 7%, weakening of the ruble, increasing export-import imbalance, the economy is on the verge of transitioning from peacetime to wartime ‒ something that has so far been successfully avoided, although generally the economy is not on the brink of collapse). There is a chronic demographic issue and growing problems with migrants from Muslim post-Soviet states. The morale of the mobilized personnel in the army is uncertain, and recently public interest in the Special Military Operation has declined while support for peace efforts has increased (which may be a consequence of the current media campaign).

At the same time, the overall situation in Ukraine is worsening across all sectors, with increasing signs that voices critical of the current authorities and their uncompromising pro-Western stance are emerging more frequently. This could potentially lead to the establishment of a kind of protectorate. Regarding rumors about the formation of a ''Coalition of the Willing'' (25,000–64,000 personnel), former Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu also challenged the idea that this coalition would act as a peacekeeping force, suggesting instead that it would support Ukraine in what he described as "Ukraine's mission to deprive Ukraine's Russian-speaking population of its native language and culture".

ASSESSMENT

The interests of the conflicting parties are diametrically, and more than that, existentially opposed, and any rapprochement of positions will proceed very slowly. The Trump administration tends to move away from the Ukrainian conflict and focus more on resolving situations in the Middle and Far East, while Europe, in the near term, lacks sufficient weaponry and significant sanction mechanisms against Russia.

The narrative of engaging a ''Coalition of the Willing'' would be perceived in the Kremlin as an occupation of Ukraine (or the parts that remain of it), regardless of the planned deployment of a ''peacekeeping'' contingent only after a peace agreement is reached. Any deployment of regular units or formations from European states without Russia’s consent would lead to an escalation of the conflict with new uncertainties, to which President Trump would respond cautiously, as he currently does (''going with the flow'‘, gradually reducing arms supplies to Ukraine and distancing himself from the ''case'').

Ultimately, the conclusion and outcome of the war will depend on the remaining capacities of the warring sides. For the Russian Federation, this hinges primarily on the economic situation and the willingness of society to continue fighting for national interests. For Ukraine, it depends on an increasingly depleted mobilization resource and the uncertain prospect of sustained Western military assistance.

Despite Russia’s current military superiority, Ukraine has not yet exhausted the essential means for defense, making it likely that hostilities will continue through the end of 2025—unless Russia launches a major offensive during the summer or, at the latest, in the autumn of this year, which remains uncertain at this point.

This is particularly the case given that Russia’s strategy of attrition, along with its applied tactics and deployment of new weaponry and technical systems, is yielding tangible results on the ground, while keeping personnel losses at a relatively acceptable level.